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When Kant separated off the Critique of Practical Reason from the Critique of Pure 
Reason, he did not solely isolate ethics from the rest of philosophy, he also drained 
theoretical philosophy of any practical element, anything involving reason’s capacity to 
change and improve reality (including, I will argue, itself). What theoretical philosophy lost 
with the splitting of the first and second Critiques was any claim to normativity, to rules and 
so to an epistemic ‘ought’. I contend, however, that in eighteenth-century German philosophy 
Kant is the exception, not the norm. Both before him (in the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition) and 
after him (in Schiller and Maimon’s work), epistemology is understood as thoroughly 
normative. Here reason is neither merely pure, nor merely practical, not even pure practical – 
it forms, instead, ‘purely practical reason’ which applies normative rules in every domain. 
In this paper, therefore, I argue for the centrality of normative rules – what I dub, 
philosophy’s ameliorative vocation – to both pre- and post-Kantian German epistemology. 
Philosophers such as Wolff, Mendelssohn, Schiller and Maimon understood themselves as 
changing the world, not merely understanding it: praxis, not contemplation, was their ideal 
(even in epistemology). This was an ameliorative philosophy that sets rules for the 
improvement of both itself and other forms of thought. 
My argument proceeds in three steps. First, I focus on one element of the Leibniz-
Wolffian project – its attempt to eliminate symbolic cognition – in order to substantiate my 
thesis. There is a pressing need for research on Leibniz-Wolffian thought: the more ingrained 
a philosophical prejudice, the more urgently it calls for reappraisal, and there is no prejudice 
in the history of philosophy stronger than that against the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition of 
German rationalism. A dearth of studies, of translations and of basic conceptual familiarity 
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with this period strongly suggests a need to attend to it.
1
 It is, of course, Kant’s three critiques 
which provide the justification for contemporary ignorance: we are too quick to accept that 
the transcendental turn inaugurated a radical sea-change in philosophical thought and so 
consigned eighteenth-century rationalism to oblivion. However, central to my argument – and 
this is its second step – is that the Leibniz-Wolffian conception of the theoretical philosopher 
as a prescriber of rules does not become obsolete with the onset of transcendental thought; it 
lives on – in transfigured form – in strands of post-Kantian philosophy. Schiller and Maimon, 
for example, still conceive of philosophy as an ameliorative enterprise. Even though the 
ameliorative self-understanding of the philosopher was particularly prominent in the Leibniz-
Wolffian tradition, it lived on after the transcendental turn. In this respect at least, Kant’s 
Copernican revolution did not bring about an immediate paradigm shift; for his successors, 
this aspect of the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition was neither obsolete nor antiquated. Finally, the 
third step of my argument returns to Kant himself to begin a discussion of the place of 
normative rules in his epistemology. The scope of this paper prevents a thorough examination 
of this issue; instead, I give two preliminary suggestions as to why Kant seems to banish 
normativity from epistemology. 
While, in what follows, I restrict my claims to eighteenth-century German philosophy, 
issues surrounding the relation of normativity to epistemology obviously have wider 
implications. On the one hand, the eighteenth-century project of setting rules for the 
amelioration of discourse forms part of the early modern obsession with method (a priori 
rules for the direction of the mind). Kant’s uneasiness with this aspect of the German 
rationalist tradition is, then, a variant of his suspicions about mathesis in general. On the other 
                                                 
1
 In the English-language literature, there are only three general studies on this period of any significance: L.W. 
Beck, Early German Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969); D.E. Wellbery, Lessing’s 
Laocoon: Semiotics and Aesthetics in the Age of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); and 
F. C. Beiser, Diotima’s Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism from Leibniz to Lessing (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). Wolff’s work has yet to be substantially translated and (with the exception of his 
Reflections on Poetry) Baumgarten’s oeuvre is only just appearing in English, thanks to the efforts of John 
Hymers, see http://hymers.eu/dr_hymers/research_baumgarten.htm.  
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hand, interest in normative rules in theoretical philosophy has recently been revived as a 
component of virtue epistemology: epistemic facts, epistemic values and the epistemic 
‘ought’ are ways of articulating obligations to improve one’s knowing. Indeed, Zagzebski has 
drawn attention to early modern methodology precisely as a valuable precursor to 
contemporary virtue epistemology. She goes on to imply that further research into early 
modern epistemology will help shape current concerns.
2
 
This paper passes through the philosophies of Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, 
Mendelssohn, Lessing, Schiller and Maimon, as well as Kant, in order to get at the role rules 
play in eighteenth-century German epistemology. As the length of this list suggests, my 
argument must remain preliminary – an overview of the conceptual territory which requires 
further exploration. I sketch the contours of a history of philosophy necessary to begin 
answering Zagzebski’s call for historical research into normative epistemology. 
 
 
1. Ameliorative Philosophy before Kant 
 
To put it bluntly, German philosophers from Leibniz to Lessing did not delimit in 
advance what philosophy is capable of and not capable of. While they were keen to define 
what philosophy ought to become, they refused to determine what philosophy is. It is this 
failure to set limits which Kant finds so objectionable: for Kant, it reveals a wider tendency to 
disregard reality, to refuse to think the facts as they actually are.
3
 However, the widespread 
tendency in the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition to avoid defining philosophy in terms of what it is 
                                                 
2
 L.T. Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of 
Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 168-9, 171. 
3
 Kant’s ‘Discipline of Pure Reason’ is the prime witness to this attitude. The phrase ‘disregard of reality’ is 
taken from B. Clack, ‘Religious Belief and the Disregard of Reality’ in J. Carlisle, J. Carter and D. Whistler 
(ed), Moral Powers, Fragile Beliefs: Essays in Moral and Religious Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2011), 
261-88. 
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(as opposed to what it could or ought to be) is precisely what makes possible the 
improvement of both philosophy itself and also other scientific and artistic discourses. In this 
first section, I will chart this concern for amelioration, first through the key concept of 
symbolic cognition, before turning explicitly to the idea of the philosopher as a bestower of 
rules; finally, I will give a more detailed case study of this type of approach in aesthetics. 
 
1.1 Symbolic Cognition 
I begin therefore by narrating the history of symbolic cognition in eighteenth-century 
Germany. This concept is particularly significant for my purposes because it presupposes that 
philosophy does not merely describe or justify experience, knowledge or reality, but 
transforms this experience, knowledge or reality for the better. The reason for this is that, as 
with many epistemological concepts, pre-Kantian philosophers interpreted symbolic 
cognition (or mediated knowledge) in a normative manner. In what follows, I am following 
Beiser who has recently drawn attention to one example of this process by which 
epistemology is normativised in his study of rationalist aesthetics in eighteenth-century 
Germany:  
As first formulated by Leibniz, [the principle of sufficient reason] states simply ‘that 
nothing is without reason’ (nihil esse sine ratione). Its chief application is to events in 
the natural world, in which case it means ‘no effect is without a cause’ (nullum 
effectum esse absque causa). But it is also applied to true beliefs or propositions, in 
which case it means that there is or should be sufficient evidence for their truth. It is 
in this latter sense that the principle is generally used in aesthetic rationalism. The 
rationalists understood it in a normative sense: that we ought to seek or have 
sufficient evidence for all our beliefs.
4
 
                                                 
4
 Beiser, Diotima’s Children, 3-4. 
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Beiser describes how principles usually applied to the world are turned reflexively back onto 
the beliefs and discourses by which we talk about the world. Descriptive facts about reality 
are transformed into normative rules for our knowledge. The principle of sufficient reason 
thus becomes a second-order rule regulating how we should think. Whereas, as a result of this 
process, the principle of sufficient reason is here held up as a principle for knowing that is to 
be recommended, symbolic cognition is a form of thought which ought to be eliminated.
5
  
Christian Wolff distinguishes between symbolic and intuitive cognition as follows, 
It should be noted that words are the basis of a special type of cognition which we 
call symbolic cognition. For we represent things to ourselves either themselves or 
through words or other signs. The first type of cognition is called intuitive cognition, 
the second is symbolic cognition.
6
 
Intuitive knowledge has a long history prior to Wolff and appears here in its traditional guise, 
possessing three essential properties: it is immediate, for cognition is intuitive when the mind 
has direct access to its object; it is knowledge of particulars, for what is known are real 
objects in the world, not ideal and universal concepts; it is indubitable: since the mind 
accesses the object directly, there is no room for error.
7
 Intuitive cognition is immediate, 
indubitable knowledge that grasps things as they actually are, without aid from artificial 
conventions, and as such it is the ideal to which man aspires. There is, however, Wolff 
insists, a second, inferior mode of gaining knowledge which is dependent on the sign rather 
than the thing itself – symbolic cognition. In opposition to intuitive cognition, symbolic 
cognition is mediated (through the sign); it knows universals (concepts rather than particular 
                                                 
5
 I am of course not claiming that either the denigration of symbolic cognition or the more general interpretation 
of principles in a normative manner is new to post-Leibnizian philosophy (very similar modes of thinking are 
present in late Scholasticism, for example; see K. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the age of Ockham (Leiden: 
Brill, 1988) and R. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997)); however, I am contending that the extent to which these normative principles orient Leibniz-
Wolffian epistemology is worthy of study. 
6
 C. Wolff, Vernuenftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen 
überhaupt (Halle, 1720), §316. Where no English citation is given, translations are my own. 
7
 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N.K. Smith (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1929), A320/B376-7; J. 
Hintikka, ‘On Kant’s Notion of Intuition (Anschauung)’ in The First Critique: Reflections on Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason, ed. T. Penelhum and J.J. MacIntosh (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1969), 40-1. 
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objects) and is prone to error (as I explain below). Symbolic cognition is a mediated 
knowledge which depends upon the conventions of language or other social constructs (like 
mathematical signs, pictures or authority) in order to reach the truth.  
 Symbolic cognition is thus knowledge by means of signs. Wolff defines the sign as 
‘what we call an entity from which another entity, either present or future or past, is known.’8 
The sign is the vehicle which the mind passes through on the way to the thing itself, when 
that thing cannot be immediate intuited. It is a means to an end. Symbolic cognition is 
therefore attenuated knowledge, distanced from what is known by the mediation of the sign. 
On the one hand, this distance can be an advantage in allowing the subject to gain knowledge 
of what is not immediately present to her, and it is for this reason that most human knowledge 
in its current state is symbolic. On the other hand, it is precisely this distance which is the 
source of error. Intuition is indubitable because it is immediately connected to its object 
which appears before the mind’s eye in its full splendour; in such conditions, there is no 
possibility of misjudgement. It is only when such splendour is dimmed by an intermediary 
(which, moreover, could easily be mistaken for the thing itself) that error becomes possible. 
Moses Mendelssohn writes, for example, that in symbolic cognition the ‘powers of the mind 
are deceived since they frequently forget the signs and believe themselves to be catching 
sight of the subject matter itself.’9 Signs generate error. Wolff and those that follow him 
therefore stand firmly within a philosophical heritage which privileges intuition over 
mediated knowledge. 
 Therefore – and this is crucial for what follows – as well as being descriptive, this 
distinction between intuitive and symbolic cognition is also normative. It is not the case that 
Wolff and his followers are merely analysing the current state of human knowledge, they are 
                                                 
8
 C. Wolff, Gesammelte Werke, ed. J. Ecole et al (Hildesheim: George Olms, 1963), II.3, §956; translated in 
Wellbery, Lessing’s Laocoon, 25. 
9
 M. Mendelssohn, Philosophical Writings, ed. and trans. D.O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 178. 
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also making claims about how knowledge ought to be. They therefore (as we shall see) 
formulate rules to achieve this end. While symbolic cognition exists at present, it does not 
possess any intrinsic value. It should be eliminated – and the philosophers in the Leibniz-
Wolffian tradition saw their task precisely in terms of the elimination of symbolic cognition 
and the consequent attainment of the ideal of pure intuition. This is what I intend to describe 
with the term ‘amelioration’: pre-Kantian German philosophers were not content merely to 
describe what is; they attempted to bring about what ought to be. They set about improving 
knowledge by means of the philosophical rule: ‘turn all symbolic cognition into intuitive 
cognition!’ 
 
1.2 Rules 
The elimination of all symbolic cognition, it was claimed, would put man in 
possession of an infallible and universal science; knowledge would be immediately of the 
things themselves, unmediated by the sign, and yet not limited to the finitely perceptible. 
Man would gain God’s infinite and indubitable power of perception. More concretely, 
language – and the linguistic sign in particular – was usually considered the site on which this 
conversion or elimination should occur, for it is the sign that separates symbolic from 
intuitive cognition. The imperative for the Wolffians therefore became to dissolve the sign 
without destroying science. The ideal was self-negating or transparent language – a system of 
signs which allows the mind to behold the thing itself as if it were an intuition. [**Spinoza is 
an uneasy ancestor to this view, as an anonymous reviewer of this paper pointed out. On the 
one hand, the more geometrico seems to offer an example of precisely such an ideal 
language; however, on the other hand, he consigns mathematics to merely fictional status in 
Letter 12. See**] 
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In order to bring about this ideal, the philosopher’s first concern was to provide rules 
for the benefit of future sciences, arts and philosophies. Those who follow the rules would 
succeed in transforming symbolic into intuitive cognition. Hence, at the centre of Leibniz-
Wolffian epistemology stand prescriptive rules for the amelioration of discourses. Wolff 
defines a rule as ‘a proposition specifying a determination that conforms to reason’10 – or, as 
Beiser paraphrases this definition, ‘a proposition laying down the reason for a practice’ which 
therefore ‘involve[s] concepts of what an object ought to be.’11 Immediately, the normative 
and practical import of these rules is made apparent. The philosopher is concerned with 
improving discourses, not describing or justifying them – and sets of rules compose a 
practical epistemology that makes this ameliorative process possible. And yet the legacy of 
this aspect of Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy is not a happy one: as Beiser writes, ‘Perhaps no 
aspect of the rationalist tradition has more discredited it in the eyes of posterity than its 
emphasis on rules.’12 In regard to the sciences and to philosophy itself (although not in regard 
to the arts on which Beiser focuses), the basis for this dismissive attitude is the supposed 
failure of rule-givers to pay attention to the conditions which prevent discourses from 
instantiating these rules – obsessed with what ought to be, they become blind to what actually 
exists and the reasons why it exists.
13
 There is, of course, much truth to this concern; 
however, far from invalidating any recourse to rules, it merely insists upon their appropriate, 
realistic application. 
 
Philosophical rules, I have argued, are applied in the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition to 
both philosophy itself and other arts and sciences. One must, therefore, distinguish between 
these two types of rule: the internal, self-reflexive rule for the amelioration of philosophical 
                                                 
10
 Wolff, Gesammelte Werke, II.3, 406. 
11
 Beiser, Diotima’s Children, 13-4. 
12
 Beiser, Diotima’s Children, 11. 
13
 In the aesthetic domain, rules supposedly conflict with artistic creativity and the non-conceptual nature of the 
artwork. 
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discourse and the external rule for the amelioration of other discourses. In other words, 
Leibniz-Wolffian epistemology did not merely give rules for the improvement of pure, 
theoretical knowledge (along the lines of early modern methodology), but also gave rules for 
technical forms of knowing (the know-how required for crafts and activities). The 
amelioration of ‘applied’ knowledge is a central ambition of these philosophers. Indeed, in 
Leibniz-Wolffian epistemology, the very hierarchy between theoretical contemplation and 
practical know-how begins to break down, for the philosopher’s relation to both is identical: 
she sets rules for the amelioration of discourse – whatever the discourse. Philosophy is 
practical in every domain. Application or praxis is not an afterthought, but the very essence 
of what it is to do epistemology.  
An illuminating example of a rule philosophy applies to itself is Leibniz’ ars 
characteristica (and all the projects for a universal language that followed in its wake). In 
particular, it illuminates how epistemic rules relate back to the overarching imperative to 
transform symbolic cognition into intuition. For Leibniz, the symbolisation and subsequent 
mathematicisation of natural language – ‘a kind of alphabet of human thoughts’14 – will 
overcome the disadvantages inherent in symbolic cognition. By following the rules of this 
calculus, philosophers soon ‘shall have as certain knowledge of God and the mind as we now 
have of figures and numbers.’15 This method is therefore a means to ‘perfect the human 
mind’16 and it does so by eliminating the possibility of error. This is not obvious: the ars 
characteristica still employs signs; however, Leibniz argues that the very order and 
simplicity of the signs used transforms this artificial language into the very rationalist ideal of 
a self-negating, transparent language. He writes, 
                                                 
14
 G.W. Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. Leroy E. Loemker (2
nd
 ed.  Dodrecht: Kluwer, 1969), 
222. 
15
 Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, 166. 
16
 Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, 166. 
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No one should fear that the contemplation of characters will lead us away from the 
things themselves; on the contrary, it leads us into the interior of things… Since the 
analysis of concepts thus corresponds exactly to the analysis of a character, we need 
merely to see the characters in order to have adequate notions brought to our mind 
freely and without effort. We can hope for no greater aid than this in the perfection of 
the mind.
17
 
The key phrase is ‘without effort’: whereas the arbitrary sign erects a barrier between mind 
and world which cognition has to break down, Leibnizian characters bring the world 
‘adequately’ into the mind. It is as if there were no mediation at all. Symbolic cognition is 
putatively transformed into intuition, hence there is no possibility of misjudgement. The ars 
characteristica perfects language to the point that it no longer acts like language. What is 
more, Wolff later interprets this aspect of the ars characteristica precisely in terms of the 
normative requirement to transform symbolism into intuition: ‘By virtue of the ars 
characteristica combinatoria symbolic cognition is converted as it were into an intuitive 
cognition, even in those cases where a distinct intuitive cognition cannot ordinarily be 
attained.’18 
 
1.3 Poetics 
 The ars characteristica is therefore an example of the rules by which philosophers 
legislate in their own domain. In this next section, I consider the way in which Leibniz-
Wolffian philosophers prescribed rules to other disciplines – in particular, to poets. The 
normative interpretation of symbolic cognition plays an identical role – the only difference is 
the type of knowing it now regulates. 
                                                 
17
 Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, 193. 
18
 Wolff, Gesammelte Werke, II.5, §312; translated in Wellbery, Lessing’s Laocoon, 40. 
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Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy distinguishes between clear and distinct ideas.19 Clear 
ideas provide the subject with the certainty of what something is without however being able 
to explain why it is.
20
 In consequence, they are associated with empirical sense data.
21
 
Through the senses, one can perceive an object, represent it correctly and judge it correctly, 
but one cannot answer the question why it is so. Clarity – as defined by Leibniz – is inferior 
to distinctness, a stage on the way to science. However, as the eighteenth century progressed, 
there developed an increasing curiosity in clear ideas for their own sake. It was this impetus 
to treat empirical ideas on their own terms which ultimately led Baumgarten in the mid-
eighteenth century to the formulation of aesthetics. It was Baumgarten’s self-imposed task in 
his Aesthetics and Reflections on Poetry to formulate a ‘science of perception’22 to isolate 
empirical ideas from scientific ones and analyse them in their own right. There thus emerged 
a field of philosophy proper to the sensible, which possessed a criterion of perfection separate 
from science proper – beauty. Aesthetics is therefore a branch of epistemology: the science of 
intuited clear ideas; and beauty is the most perfect clear idea, independent of any relationship 
to distinctness.
23
 Clarity here obtains autonomy. 
 As this idea of perfection already implies, once again philosophers were not 
concerned merely with describing our sensible ideas, but with ameliorating them, with 
formulating the rules and principles by which empirical cognition can be perfected. Beauty or 
perfect sensuous presentation was the end towards which pre-Kantian aestheticians laboured: 
‘The end of aesthetics is the perfection of sensuous cognition which, however, as such is 
                                                 
19
 The locus classicus is Leibniz’ Discourse on Metaphysics, §24 (Philosophical Papers and Letters, 318-9). 
20
 It is extremely significant that the examples Leibniz uses to illustrate clear ideas are artworks, for clarity later 
becomes the domain of aesthetic judgments (Philosophical Papers and Letters, 318-9). 
21
 See, for instance, A.G. Baumgarten, Reflections on Poetry, ed. and trans. K.A. Brenner and W.B. Holther 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), 38. 
22
 Baumgarten, Reflections on Poetry, 78. On this interpretation of Baumgarten’s significance, see Beiser, 
Diotima’s Children, 149-55. 
23
 See Baumgarten, Reflections on Poetry, 42; Mendelssohn, Philosophical Writings, 172. 
  
13 
beauty.’24 Aesthetics was governed by the epistemic rule: ‘transform imperfect, clear ideas 
into beautiful ones!’ 
This is most evident with respect to the problematic status poetry held in this new 
discipline of aesthetics. Poetics was such a popular topic for philosophers in the Leibniz-
Wolffian tradition (from Baumgarten’s Reflections on Poetry to Lessing’s Laocoön) precisely 
because the need to reconcile poetry with aesthetic theory was so pressing. In short, for 
Baumgarten and his followers, aesthetics makes a paradox out of poetry. On the one hand, 
poetry is art; its perfection is beauty, and thus it should be presented in clear ideas gained 
intuitively from the sensible world. On the other hand, however, poetry is language; it is 
composed of signs – of distinct ideas gained by symbolic cognition. This is the paradox of 
poetry: it is both beautiful and conceptual at the same time.
25
 The role of the aesthetician is to 
solve this paradox, to show how poetry can find a place within aesthetics – to show that 
language can after all be beautiful. And once again this takes the form of an ameliorative 
imperative: the role of the aesthetician is to provide the rules which demonstrate how 
‘symbolic cognition could be transformed back through poetry into intuitive cognition.’26 
Poetry – like philosophy generally – must rid itself of signs (and so symbolic cognition) for 
the sake of clear and intuitive beauty. The aesthetician must demonstrate the possibility of 
transforming what is distinct, intellectual and symbolic into something intuitive; to negate the 
sign for a direct sensible relation to the thing itself. The very same imperative I located in 
regard to Leibniz-Wolffian epistemology as a whole is here deployed within poetics. Again, 
we see that Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy is not merely descriptive, but also normative 
(‘symbolic cognition ought to be eliminated’), and this normativity is a central part of the 
                                                 
24
 A.G. Baumgarten, Aesthetica (Frankfurt an der Oder, 1750), 6; translated in D.O. Dahlstrom, ‘Editor’s 
Introduction’ to M. Mendelssohn, Philosophical Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), xiv. 
25
 See Baumgarten, Reflections on Poetry, 52-3. 
26
 M. Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. G.B. Mendelssohn (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1843), IV, 348-9; 
translated in Wellbery, Lessing’s Laocoon, 73. 
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epistemological project. As Gottsched put it, ‘Everything comes down to a science of rules.’27 
Just as in general the philosopher gives rules for improving knowledge, so too she gives rules 
to make poetry beautiful. 
 
It is worth exploring one concrete example of a rule aestheticians formulated for the 
conversion of symbolic into intuitive poetry. This rule makes recourse to natural sign theory, 
and reads in short: ‘convert arbitrary signs into natural ones!’ The natural sign is a linguistic 
symbol which does not exhibit the disadvantages of symbolic cognition, but rather putatively 
gives rise to intuitive cognition (just like Leibniz’s ars characteristica). Natural signs seem to 
do the impossible (they are both beautiful and linguistic) and for this reason become one end 
aestheticians prescribe to poets. 
Mendelssohn’s distinction between arbitrary and natural signs reads thus, 
The signs by means of which an object is expressed can be either natural or arbitrary. 
They are natural if the combination of the sign with the subject matter signified is 
grounded in the very properties of what is designated… Those signs, on the other 
hand, that by their very nature have nothing in common with the designated subject 
matter, but that have nonetheless been arbitrarily assumed as signs for it, are called 
“arbitrary”.28 
The difference rests on the type of connection between sign and referent: arbitrary signs have 
a merely conventional relationship instituted by the free choice of the subject. Almost all 
language for eighteenth-century philosophers was arbitrary and such arbitrariness gave rise to 
the very epistemological errors explored earlier in regard to symbolic cognition. Hence Wolff 
defines the arbitrary sign as follows, 
                                                 
27
 J.C. Gottsched, Ausgewählte Werke, ed. P.M. Mitchell (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1973), II, 4; translated in Beiser, 
Diotima’s Children, 93. Beiser writes of Gottsched’s aesthetic work in this vein, ‘It was not simply a theoretical 
treatise about the principles of poetry but also a practical manual about how to write good verse.’ (88). 
28
 Mendelssohn, Philosophical Writings, 177-8. 
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We also have the practice of bringing two entities together as we please – entities 
which otherwise would not come together – and making one the sign of the other. 
Such signs are called arbitrary signs… Words belong among the arbitrary signs: for 
that a word and an idea are present together at the same time or that one of the two 
follows upon the other rests on our free choice.
29
 
Since the sign does not resemble its referent, its referent cannot be truly perceived from the 
sign alone. Due to its conventional nature, the sign obscures what it marks; it can thus give 
rise to error.
30
 Such is language’s fundamental limitation: it often leaves the mind stranded at 
the level of signs without access to the thing it should be cognising. In this way, science is 
impeded. 
With natural signs, however, there is an objective reason for the choice of sign: the 
sign is naturally grounded in the thing itself.
31
 Mendelssohn’s example is onomatopoeia: ‘A 
poet frequently makes use of words and syllables whose natural sound has a similarity with 
the designated subject matter.’32 Such onomatopoeic sounds are natural signs, because there 
is a natural connection between their own being and that of the referent. This is not a 
connection dreamed up and imposed by the subject, but one objectively already there, pre-
existing the subject (who merely discovers and articulates it). Natural signs follow naturally 
from their referent and so avoid the pitfalls of symbolic cognition. The natural sign is not an 
intermediary which obscures the referent and thus needs to be concealed; it is an 
epistemological aid rather than a hindrance. Through natural signs, Mendelssohn claims, ‘one 
enjoys the advantage of providing an essential and non-arbitrary designation for discovering 
and grasping the truth.’33 Natural signs facilitate intuitive knowledge. 
                                                 
29
 Wolff, Vernuenftige Gedancken, §294; translated in Wellbery, Lessing’s Laocoon, 18-9. The emphasis on free 
choice keeps the Leibniz-Wolffian conception of the arbitrary sign distinct from Saussurean variants. 
30
 See Mendelssohn, Philosophical Writings, 272-3. 
31
 See T. Todorov, Theories of the Symbol, trans. C. Porter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 129. 
32
 Mendelssohn, Philosophical Writings, 181. 
33
 Mendelssohn, Philosophical Writings, 265. 
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 Natural signs are, then, one solution to the paradox of poetry, one means to make 
poetry beautiful and eliminate symbolic cognition. Thus, Meier proposes the following rule, 
‘All arbitrary signs must imitate natural signs to as great a degree as possible if they are to be 
truly beautiful’34 and Lessing famously contends in his ‘Letter to Nicolai’, ‘Poetry must 
endeavour absolutely to elevate its arbitrary signs into natural ones.’35 The problem, however, 
is that there are so few examples of natural signs; those often seized upon include 
onomatopoeia (see above), emotional cries
36
, dramatic performances
37
 and metaphors
38
. The 
scarcity of examples meant that to convert arbitrary signs into natural ones (and so to convert 
symbolic cognition into intuition) poets must, the aestheticians prescribe, cultivate 
metaphors, onomatopoeia, cries and drama as intensely as possible. 
 
 
2. Ameliorative Philosophy after Kant 
 
 The image of the philosopher as a prescriber of rules and the normative interpretation 
of symbolic cognition did not die out and became obsolete in the wake of the publication of 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in 1781. The transcendental turn was not revolutionary in this 
respect: post-Kantian philosophers transfigure these concepts, rather than eliminate them. In 
order to demonstrate this in what follows, I give two examples of the persistence of the 
ameliorative paradigm for philosophising: first, in the rules Schiller sets to the poet in his 
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Kallias Briefe; second, in the re-emergence of a normative interpretation of symbolic 
cognition in Maimon’s Essay on Transcendental Philosophy. 
 
2.1 Schiller 
Schiller’s aesthetic output of the early 1790s is usually (and rightly) considered 
Kantian in inspiration. From the moment he first read the Critique of Judgment in Spring 
1791, Schiller professed himself a disciple of Kant. However, it is equally important to stress 
that during the 1770s he was educated in the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition. Recognition of this 
fact is significant for our understanding of post-Kantian aesthetics more broadly: if the 
Schlegels, Schelling, Hölderlin and Hegel were all influenced by Schiller, then what he 
bequeathed them is (to some extent) a concern with pre-Kantian problems. A metamorphosed 
Leibniz-Wolffian tradition lives on through Schiller and his heirs. 
Hence, in a number of passages in his post-1791 oeuvre, Schiller describes problems 
with the idea of poetic language in a manner that resembles Baumgarten, Mendelssohn and 
Lessing far more than Kant. Here, Schiller resurrects the spectre of the paradox of poetry. 
Overall, there are three fundamental problems, Schiller suggests, with predicating beauty of 
pieces of writing and so of reconciling poetics with aesthetics. The first is the conceptual 
nature of language. Language is a mediated, universal mode of communication – in other 
words, it gives rise to symbolic cognition. It is therefore ill-suited to expressing the sensible 
particularity required of a truly aesthetic product. Schiller writes in the Kallias Briefe: 
The poet’s medium is words; abstract signs for types and species but never for 
individuals… This is the very problem. Words as well as the conditional and 
connecting laws are very general things which do not serve as signs to one but to an 
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infinite number of individuals… The poet has no other means than the artistic 
construction of the universal to depict the particular.
39
 
The poet – limited to a linguistic medium – is immediately handicapped in her ability to 
produce beauty. Whereas linguistic symbols are universals, beautiful works of art must 
operate intuitively and so in the domain of the particular. Such is Schiller’s restatement of the 
paradox of poetry – and it is, I think, self-evidently derivative of pre-Kantian formulations. 
As Schiller goes on to put it, ‘The nature of the medium, which the poet helps himself to, is 
thus made up of “the tendency to universalise” and thus conflicts with the descriptions (which 
is its task) of the individual.’40 The generality of its medium contradicts the specificity of the 
poem’s purpose. 
Second (and again this is a Schillerian version of the pre-Kantian paradox of poetry), 
language is arbitrary and such arbitrariness prohibits it from becoming a beautiful artwork. In 
the Aesthetic Letters Schiller even goes so far as to concede the impossibility of beautiful 
poetry because of this limitation: 
Even the most successful poem partakes more of the arbitrary and casual play of the 
imagination, as the medium through which it works, than the inner lawfulness of the 
truly beautiful really permits.
41
 
He is less bold in the Kallias Briefe, however, where he merely indicates that ‘there is some 
difficulty in the mere formal similarity between words and things. The thing and its 
expression in words are connected only contingently and arbitrarily (a few cases 
notwithstanding), merely related by agreement.’42 Again, we saw the very same problem 
emerge for Baumgarten and his followers; it led to the rule: ‘convert arbitrary signs into 
natural ones!’ – as it will do for Schiller in turn. 
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Third – and here Schiller moves away from his reliance on Leibniz-Wolffian 
aesthetics – language is too particular. Poetry cannot leave its content in a sufficient state of 
productive indeterminability; instead, it is forced to overdetermine what it talks about. For 
example, Schiller writes, 
The composer and the landscape painter achieve [beauty] only through the form of 
their presentation and merely attune the mind to a certain way of feeling… They 
leave up to the listeners and spectators how to give it content. The poet by contrast… 
provides content for each symbol of the imagination and so gives to it a more 
determinate direction. However, he should not forget that his meddling in this 
business has its limits… He should not anticipate the imagination of his readers. 
Every complete determination is here felt as a troublesome barrier.
43
 
Again, language seems an unpromising medium in which to produce beauty – this time 
because language determines too much. In Kantian terminology, it stimulates judgment to 
operate in a determinate rather than reflective manner. As this suggests, Schiller here stands 
closer to Kant than Baumgarten, although broader changes in poetic taste could also be 
responsible for this shift.
44
 Nonetheless, Schiller still uses this problem with poetry in a very 
traditional manner to emphasise its exceptional status as an art form, and thus the difficulty of 
reconciling it with beauty. Schiller, that is, uses language’s tendency to overdetermine as 
cumulative evidence for the paradox of poetry. 
 
 Not only, however, does Schiller reinvent the paradox of poetry, one of the solutions 
he gives to this paradox is also appropriated from the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition – natural 
                                                 
43
 F. Schiller, Über Matthissons Gedichte in Werke Nationalausgabe, ed. J. Petersen et al (Weimar: Böhlaus, 
1958), XXII, 273-4. 
44
 The relation of this formulation of the problem to the previous two suggests a cultural shift in the paradigm 
for art: while the previous two posit painting (and so an iconic relation between sign and referent) as the ideal 
for poetry (as was common in Enlightenment aesthetics), this third formulation is different: the underdetermined 
formalism of music is now the exemplar to which poetry aspires. See Abrams’ account of the cultural shift from 
ut pictura poesis to ut musica (The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition (New 
York: Norton, 1958), 50-1, 90-4). 
  
20 
signs. Schiller reclaims the distinction between arbitrary and natural signs as a means of 
prescribing rules for the creation of beautiful poetry. In so doing, he does not merely reclaim 
its descriptive dimension, but also its normativity. In other words, Schiller too insists on the 
rule, ‘convert arbitrary signs into natural ones!’ He therefore recaptures something of 
philosophy’s ameliorative vocation. Hence, even though the epistemological basis for this 
rule is absent, there remains a version of the rule itself, which implicitly presupposes such a 
practical, normative epistemology. 
 In the Kallias Briefe, for example, Schiller reiterates Leibniz-Wolffian anti-discursive 
sentiment. Linguistic signs are the problem and need to be eliminated; the sign must be 
destroyed: 
An object may thus only be freely depicted if the nature of the depicted object has not 
suffered from the nature of the depicting matter. The nature of the medium or the 
matter must thus be completely vanquished.
45
 
He continues, ‘The object to be depicted must step forth freely and victoriously from the 
depicting object in spite of all the chains of language.’46 The poet’s means of depiction or the 
forms he works in – language – are the very problem which stops poetry from attaining 
beauty. 
 In Schiller’s 1795 On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry, this normative demand to 
destroy language is further embedded in a teleological genealogy. Both ancient and modern 
poetry are found wanting, so only a poet of the future will be able to finally overcome the 
limitations of the linguistic sign, overcome the paradox of poetry and make poetry beautiful. 
That is, instead of prescribing rules to contemporary poets for this end, as pre-Kantian 
aestheticians had done, Schiller invokes a genius-to-come. He writes, 
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If to the [moderns] the sign remains forever heterogeneous and alien to the thing 
signified, to the [future poet] language springs as by some inner necessity out of 
thought and is so at one with it that even beneath the corporeal frame the spirit 
appears as if laid bare. It is precisely this mode of expression in which the sign 
disappears in the thing signified.
47
 
The poet of the future will invent a new kind of language in order to ensure her poetry is 
beautiful. In such future language, sign and referent will not remain ‘forever heterogeneous 
and alien’, but fuse together as one. The referent is absorbed into the sign. Although such a 
conception of language anticipates the romantic symbol, its most obvious precedent is the 
natural sign. At present, sign and referent are disconnected, in the future they will be one – 
such is Schiller’s version of the pre-Kantian rule, ‘convert arbitrary signs into natural ones!’ 
Schiller maps such amelioration onto history: the future will be an improvement on the 
present, since beautiful poetry will then be possible. 
 Schiller therefore resurrects the paradox of poetry; he reattaches it to an ameliorative 
process of transforming arbitrary signs into natural ones, and so hands these pre-Kantian 
modes of thought down to his Romantic and Idealist heirs. 
 
2.2 Maimon 
Salomon Maimon, like Schiller, has a foot in both camps. He is a post-Kantian 
philosopher who takes pre-Kantian traditions seriously. Yet, while critics have been tempted 
to treat Schiller’s aesthetics as a reduction of critical thought back into dogmatism48, the same 
cannot so easily be done of Maimon. In other words, Maimon, takes to heart the paradigm-
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shift that philosophy underwent on the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781. It 
is for this reason Kant wrote on encountering Maimon’s 1790 Essay on Transcendental 
Philosophy for the first time, 
Just a glance at it was enough to make me recognise its excellence, and not only that 
none of my opponents had understood me and the principle question as well as 
Maimon, but also that only a few people possess such an acute mind for such 
profound investigations.
49
 
This is not to say that Maimon is a promulgator of Kantianism or even that he could not more 
happily be described as a Leibnizian than a Kantian. It is rather to say that Maimon’s 
philosophy is a concerted effort to, on the one hand, understand and make sense of the 
transcendental standpoint, but also, on the other hand, to subject Kantian philosophy to an 
intense testing against the philosophical tradition. Maimon both explains and interrogates 
Kant’s thought – and this interrogation is geared towards clarifying Kant’s relation to pre-
Kantian philosophers. 
 With these general comments in mind, I turn to the fate of symbolic cognition in 
Maimon’s philosophy which provides the clue to the fate of normative epistemology therein. 
Unsurprisingly given such comments, symbolic cognition is central to Maimon’s project. 
Indeed, so prevalent is its role in Maimon’s philosophy that for the purposes of this paper I 
am only able to concentrate on its significance in his earliest work, Essay on Transcendental 
Idealism. Not only does the term ‘symbolic cognition’ regularly occur in the body of the text, 
Maimon devotes an entire appendix to it, entitled ‘On Symbolic Cognition and Philosophical 
Language’. It is to this appendix I turn first. 
The appendix begins with the unequivocal assertion, ‘Symbolic cognition is of great 
importance’ (ETP 139), and Maimon goes on to construct a theory of symbolic cognition 
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closely dependent on his Leibniz-Wolffian predecessors: he quotes Wolff and Baumgarten’s 
definitions, as well as providing a traditional account of its advantages and disadvantages 
(ETP 139). Maimon even suggests that the question of symbolic cognition stands at the very 
heart of philosophical endeavour (even if he mimics the Prefaces of the first Critique to make 
this point):  
I venture to claim that the insoluble difficulties and important disputes in the sciences 
have arisen from a lack of insight into the nature of symbolic cognition, and hence 
that these difficulties can be overcome and these disputes resolved merely by setting 
down the limits of use of symbolic cognition. (ETP 139) 
 Yet, even here, Maimon surreptitiously and subtly alters the idea of symbolic 
cognition. As we have seen, for Wolff and his successors, symbolic cognition is knowledge 
of an object through the intermediary of a sign. For Maimon, however, symbolic cognition is 
knowledge of a sign instead of an object. He argues that since ‘signs are signs only because 
they lead to the representation of things’ (ETP 140), then insofar as we know these signs as 
representing things, there is little difference between such symbolic cognition and intuitive 
cognition. Of course, this is precisely what philosophers in the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition 
would reject, for to know a thing via its sign is to know it in a mediated manner. Nonetheless, 
Maimon continues that pure symbolic cognition – symbolic cognition that is opposed to 
intuitive cognition – must occur when ‘only the representation of the sign is present, without 
the representation of the thing’ (ETP 141). Symbolic cognition is cognition of the sign in 
itself (to the extent that it does not refer). Maimon’s conception is therefore much stronger 
than Wolff’s or Baumgarten’s, for Maimonian symbolic cognition does not have every sign 
as its object, only those signs whose referent is inaccessible intuitively. 
 While the above can be considered a debate within the parameters set by the Leibniz-
Wolffian tradition, three pages into the appendix there occurs a sharp change in direction. 
Maimon begins to interpret symbolic cognition through the lens of transcendental philosophy. 
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More specifically, he reads the intuitive/symbolic dichotomy onto Kant’s distinction between 
the matter and form of experience. That is, at this juncture, Maimon, on the one hand, makes 
explicitly clear his dissatisfaction with traditional Leibniz-Wolffian discourse about symbolic 
cognition: it determines symbolic cognition ‘merely by means of a subjective ground… [it] 
does not determine an object’ (ETP 141). And, on the other hand, he introduces Kantian 
terminology to overcome this dissatisfaction: 
An object of cognition is a unity that is thought by the understanding in the manifold; 
the manifold is the given, or the matter; but the unity is the form that connects the 
matter of the manifold. (ETP 141) 
Maimon continues by claiming that matter (the manifold and forms of intuition) and form 
(categories and concepts, i.e. forms of the understanding) can only be experienced on the 
condition that they are synthesised in an object: ‘In this way we are in a position to have 
intuitive cognition not only of the object, but also, in and through this object, to have intuitive 
cognition of its matter in itself and its form in itself’ (ETP 142). When I experience a table, I 
experience the form and matter that constitute the table. However, Maimon is insistent, ‘This 
is the only way we can ever have intuitive cognition of the form’ (ETP 142). I cannot intuit 
the form of the table (the categories and concepts which structure it) as form independently 
of the matter of experience. This does not mean that forms do not exist outside of their 
synthesis with matter; rather, insofar as a philosopher is aware of forms in themselves, she 
cognises them symbolically: 
In this case therefore we find ourselves forced to think of something of which we 
have no intuitive cognition as a real object, so that we can represent it only by means 
of signs, and hence it comprises an object of symbolic cognition. (ETP 142) 
Forms of the understanding exist, yet are inaccessible to intuition; therefore, they are objects 
of symbolic cognition. The whole transcendental machinery of the understanding is solely 
cognisable symbolically. That is, since these forms so crucial to the transcendental 
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philosopher’s enterprise are merely known as signs, transcendental philosophy – at some of 
its most crucial moments – becomes sign manipulation. Hence, Maimon speaks of philosophy 
as a ‘universal grammar’ (ETP 154) or a ‘calculus’ (ETP 147) in the tradition of Leibniz’s ars 
characteristica. 
 
 However, while this is certainly evidence of the persistence of the concept of 
symbolic cognition in a transcendental framework, it is not yet evidence of its normative 
interpretation in Maimon’s philosophy. For pre-Kantian philosophers, lest we forget, 
symbolic cognition was invoked only as something that must be eliminated – it ‘ought not’ to 
exist. For Maimon, however, symbolic cognition is fundamental to our very ability to 
philosophise. Eliminate symbolic cognition and transcendental philosophy becomes 
impossible. Therefore, symbolic cognition does possess value for the philosopher and there is 
no reason why she would desire to eliminate it (precisely the opposite in fact). The world 
would no longer be a better place without symbolic cognition and because of this the 
ameliorative background to the intuitive/symbolic dichotomy seems to have been lost in 
Maimon’s philosophy. 
 Yet, this is not the whole story, for elsewhere in his Essay on Transcendental Idealism 
Maimon gives reasons why symbolic cognition in fact retains links with the amelioration of 
discourse. The key to this additional element of Maimon’s account is to be found in his 
creative reinterpretation of the transcendental deduction. The transcendental deduction is of 
course meant by Kant to answer the question, quid juris? – that is, with what right does 
experience lay claim to objective (universal and necessary) properties. Maimon, however, 
reinterprets quid juris? as a question of whether symbolic forms can be made intuitive. He 
writes, 
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Concepts can precede the intuition, in which case they are merely symbolic, and their 
objective reality is problematic. So the question quid juris? is relevant to these 
concepts, i.e. whether or not these symbolic concepts can also be made intuitive and 
thereby obtain objective reality. (ETP 30) 
Categories of the understanding are one kind of symbolic form, as we have seen. The 
question of whether these categories necessarily and universally structure experience (Kant’s 
question in the first Critique) participates in a more general question of whether symbolic 
forms of experience can ever be accessed intuitively. In other words, can the unities 
underlying thought come to expression in intuition?
50
 In other words, it is only through 
processes of amelioration (the transformation of symbolic into intuitive cognition) that 
concepts can be accessed intuitively and so ‘obtain objective reality’. Of course, in the rest of 
the Essay, Maimon spends much more time spelling out what this epistemological 
amelioration could mean and prescribing the concrete rules to bring it about; however, the 
basis of his return to the normative interpretation of symbolic cognition is to be found in the 
quotation above. 
 So Maimon’s simultaneously drags pre-Kantian language across the transcendental 
threshold and reinterprets Kantian thought in terms of pre-Kantian conceptual structures. 
Moreover, in consequence, the ameliorative vocation for philosophy which was so central to 
the pre-Kantian employment of symbolic cognition now reappears reinserted into a 
transcendental framework. Maimon translates the Kantian requirement for the categories to 
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attain objective reality into the pre-Kantian ‘demand that a merely symbolic concept be made 
intuitive’ (ETP 35). As such, Maimon’s recovery of symbolic cognition is not merely 
descriptive, it plays a transformative role as well: symbolic cognition should be eliminated. 
Normativity stands at the heart of his epistemology. 
 
 
3. Kant and Descriptive Philosophy 
 
 If the above puts to rest the idea that normative epistemology is dead after Kant, it 
gives rise to pressing questions concerning Kant’s own relation to the ameliorative tradition. 
There is no room in this paper for a full discussion of the fate of theoretical philosophy’s 
ameliorative vocation in Kant’s oeuvre; in what follows, I merely wish to sketch two 
indications why Kant’s philosophy is difficult to reconcile with this conception of 
philosophy.
51
 Instead, I provisionally conclude, Kant’s theoretical project is for the most part 
descriptive – an epistemology which understands its role less in terms of providing rules for 
the improvement of knowing than in terms of justifying an already existing state of affairs. 
Kant’s whole enterprise is orientated to the delimitation of philosophy’s capacities: a 
definition of philosophy that sets limits on what it can achieve in light of what it now 
achieves. Such limitations prohibit any future amelioration on the part of theoretical 
philosophy. 
 
3.1 Transcendental Arguments 
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 The first indication of Kant’s distance from an ameliorative paradigm is to be found in 
his characterisation of transcendental arguments. Kant shifts philosophy’s focus away from 
experience itself to the conditions of experience and hence away from evaluating that 
experience to legitimating it. He writes, ‘I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is 
occupied not so much with objects as the mode of our knowledge of objects insofar as this 
mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori.’52 Transcendental philosophy neglects the task 
of cognising objects in favour of cognising the conditions of such first-order cognition; in so 
doing, it not only assumes that there is such first-order cognition, but also – and this is what is 
crucial – that there should be.53 
The structure of transcendental arguments makes this second assumption clear. Their 
premise is always an experiential fact (‘X’) from which certain conditions are shown to be 
necessary, leading to the conclusion: ‘If X, then conditions A and B necessarily hold.’ The 
very point of the experiential fact is that it is to be so uncontroversial (experience of temporal 
succession, for example) as to be putatively indubitable. However, of course, this 
indubitability is not argued for, but rather assumed. From Maimon through to Stroud, this has 
been a recurrent objection against transcendental arguments: namely that they take 
experience for granted – and to this extent beg the question.54 What is more, transcendental 
philosophers also ascribe certain properties to this experience: it does not, for example, exist 
in flux, but is stable enough to be referred to as a discrete and determinable ‘fact’. It is also 
neutral or value-free – that is, the philosopher is debarred from asking whether inquiry into 
the conditions of X is worth being pursued. The value of X is bracketed. 
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Experience is a value-free datum. In other words, the question, ‘what are the 
necessary conditions of X?’, not only takes for granted that there is X, but further that there 
should be X and so it takes for granted that the philosopher should accept the continued 
existence of X. Indeed, the whole point of a transcendental argument is to justify this 
experience as what is.
55
 We glimpse here the in-built conservatism of transcendental 
philosophy: its task is to justify the already-accepted status quo by revealing what makes it 
possible. The transcendental philosopher recognises why what is is; in theoretical philosophy 
at least, she has no truck with what ought to be. Kant’s philosophy, in this respect, excludes 
the possibility of normative rules: the world is to be described, not altered. 
 
3.2 The Fate of Symbolic Cognition in Kant’s Philosophy 
 The second indication of the priority given to description above amelioration can be 
discerned from the fate of symbolic cognition in Kant’s critical works. Galland-Szymkowiak 
summarises as follows, 
Between Leibniz’s Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas (1684) and Kant’s 
Critique of Judgment (1790), the meaning of the symbol was radically transformed. 
From a mere arbitrary sign which is conventionally substituted for an idea, the 
symbol became intuitive presentation… Kant consciously (and in a historically 
decisive manner) announces a rupture from the meaning attributed to the symbol by 
the Leibniz-Wolffian school.
56
 
The whole idea of a ‘symbol’ undergoes a revolution in Kant’s critical philosophy. Kant 
transforms symbols into perceptual Darstellungen and, in so doing, purposefully attacks the 
very idea of symbolic cognition. He states categorically, ‘The intuitive in cognition must be 
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contrasted with the discursive (not the symbolic). The former is… symbolic.’57 In 
consequence, symbolic cognition as understood by pre-Kantian philosophers is no more. 
While of course Kant’s mutation of the symbol into an analogic Darstellung of the 
supersensible was profoundly productive for much later thought
58
, there is no mistaking its 
polemic intent in respect to his predecessors. 
 In §59 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant turns on its head the Leibniz-Wolffian 
distinction between symbolic and intuitive cognition. The major epistemological principle 
resides now not in the ‘contrast [of] symbolic with intuitive Darstellung’, but rather in the 
fact that symbols are a form of intuitive knowledge, and so ‘must be contrasted with the 
discursive’. Kant writes,  
The more recent logicians [in the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition] have come to use the 
word symbolic in another sense that is wrong and runs counter to the meaning of the 
word. They use it to contrast symbolic with intuitive presentation. For the latter (the 
intuitive) can be divided into schematic and symbolic presentation: both are 
hypotyposes, i.e. Darstellungen, not mere characterizations, i.e. designations of 
concepts by accompanying sensible signs.
59 
Kant here wages a battle on two fronts: on the one hand, he redefines the symbol (as 
intuitive) in a way that thoroughly distances it from its Leibniz-Wolffian heritage; on the 
other hand, he consigns discursive mediation to the role of mere characterisation. Such 
mediation, he contends, has nothing to do with knowledge: 
Signs contain nothing whatever that belongs to the intuition of the object; their point 
is the subjective one of serving as a means for reproducing concepts… They are 
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either words, or visible (algebraic or even mimetic) signs, and they merely express 
concepts.
60
 
Signs are subjective, arbitrary aids for communicating concepts – a role of no philosophical 
importance. The sign has nothing to do with epistemology, but is solely a device for 
communicating already processed philosophical thought; therefore, there is no such thing as 
knowledge gained solely through discourse according to Kant. In this passage from the third 
Critique, symbolic cognition disappears from philosophy. 
Indeed, this is also the implication of the famous dictum from the first Critique, 
concepts without intuitions are ‘empty’.61 Symbolic cognition had been premised on the 
possibility of knowing things without intuiting them; Kant counters that only what can be 
intuited can be known; therefore, there is only intuitive cognition. Symbolic cognition is not 
cognition; it can provide no sort of experience. While, it is true, Kant still holds open the 
possibility of employing ‘empty signs’ for thinking (and so permits ‘symbolic thinking’), 
symbolism and knowledge remain opposed.
62
 Ultimately, rather than man’s finitude being 
marked by his dependence on the sign as the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition contended, for Kant 
man’s finitude is due to his dependence on sensible intuition. 
In a way, Kant here completes the Leibniz-Wolffian project: rather than philosophy’s 
being beholden to the rule to eliminate symbolic cognition in the future, according to Kant 
philosophy can now claim that there is no symbolic cognition – it can redescribe knowledge 
so that symbolic cognition no longer exists. In Kantian philosophy, the Leibniz-Wolffian 
                                                 
60
 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 5:352. 
61
 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A51/B75. 
62
 Kant’s comments on algebra (Critique of Pure Reason, A717/B745) seem, on first sight, to contradict this 
analysis: ‘In algebra by means of a symbolic construction, just as in geometry by means of an ostensive 
construction, we succeed in arriving at results which discursive knowledge would never have reached by means 
of mere concepts’. The meaning of this passage is controversial; however, the most plausible view (L. Shabel, 
‘Kant on the “Symbolic Construction” of Mathematical Concepts’ in Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science 29.4 (1998): 589-621) is that Kant is not here suggesting that one can construct by means of signs and 
so attain knowledge through them, rather the signs are always substitutes for spatial or temporal intuitions to 
which they must be reduced for construction to take place (see Kant, Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-70, 2:278; 
Critique of Judgment, 5:352). That is, there is no knowledge through signs alone. 
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ideal is realised. Yet, in the process, a vital element of the Leibniz-Wolffian conception of 
philosophy is lost – its ameliorative vocation. If epistemology has been perfected and 
symbolic cognition has always already been eliminated, then the normativity central to 
Leibniz-Wolffian epistemology disappears: there is nothing to be improved. This is one 
symptom, I contend, of Kant’s shift to a descriptive philosophical method that justifies the 
status quo and legitimates what is. The elimination of symbolic cognition has already taken 
place, rather than being in the process of taking place. 
 
 
Conclusion 
  
When it comes to normative epistemology, Kant’s Copernican Revolution is not the 
final word. There remain strong lines of continuity between pre- and post-Kantian German 
philosophy. Maimon and Schiller reintroduce an ameliorative imperative according to which 
philosophy labours to improve discourse; more specifically, theoretical philosophy is not only 
concerned with what is, but also with what should be. Philosophy can improve our 
knowledge and prescribing rules for the elimination of symbolic cognition is part of that 
ameliorative process, for pre- and post-Kantians alike. In sum, epistemology applies rules, for 
it consists first and foremost in the praxis of ameliorating knowledge of all types. 
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